Introduction to Kubernetes Security: Why a Comprehensive Approach Matters
Kubernetes security is inherently complex and multi-layered, spanning access control and authentication, network isolation and traffic policies, secrets and sensitive data management, container image security and vulnerability scanning, runtime security and threat detection, cluster hardening and infrastructure protection, and compliance with regulatory frameworks like SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, and GDPR. A single misconfiguration or oversight in any of these layers can expose your entire infrastructure to severe security incidents including unauthorized data access where attackers read sensitive customer information or proprietary business data, privilege escalation where attackers gain cluster-admin rights and take complete control of the cluster, lateral movement where compromised containers access other pods, databases, or cloud resources they shouldn't reach, data exfiltration where attackers steal databases or secrets and transmit them externally, cryptomining where attackers deploy resource-intensive cryptocurrency miners consuming your cloud budget, ransomware attacks encrypting persistent volumes and demanding payment, supply chain attacks through compromised base images or malicious dependencies, and compliance violations resulting in regulatory fines, failed audits, loss of certifications, and reputational damage that drives customers away.
The challenge is that Kubernetes security isn't a single toggle or configuration it requires implementing dozens of interconnected controls across multiple dimensions. You can have perfect RBAC preventing unauthorized human access, but if you allow privileged containers, attackers can escape containers and compromise nodes. You can lock down pod security, but if network policies aren't implemented, compromised pods can scan and attack other services across your cluster. You can secure the cluster itself, but if you pull untrusted container images without vulnerability scanning, you deploy pre-compromised applications directly into production.
This comprehensive Kubernetes security checklist provides 50 actionable, production-tested security practices organized into logical categories, based on official security frameworks including the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark (industry-standard security configuration guide), NSA and CISA Kubernetes Hardening Guide (government security guidance), Kubernetes Security documentation and CVE analysis, and real-world production security incidents and lessons learned from breaches. Each practice includes clear implementation instructions, explains why it matters with real attack scenarios, provides ready-to-use YAML configurations or kubectl commands, and indicates compliance frameworks it addresses (CIS, SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI-DSS). We'll also demonstrate how Atmosly automates the implementation of many of these security controls, continuously monitors for violations, and provides compliance reporting showing which practices are implemented versus missing across your clusters.
By methodically implementing these 50 practices, you'll establish defense-in-depth security posture for your Kubernetes infrastructure, dramatically reduce attack surface and risk exposure, meet regulatory compliance requirements with auditable controls, prevent the most common Kubernetes security incidents that plague improperly secured clusters, and gain security confidence enabling your organization to move faster with Kubernetes while maintaining strong security rather than treating security and velocity as opposing forces.
Category 1: Access Control & Authentication (Practices 1-10)
Practice 1: Enable RBAC Authorization
Implementation: Ensure Kubernetes API server runs with --authorization-mode=RBAC (default in Kubernetes 1.6+)
Verification:
# Check RBAC is enabled
kubectl api-versions | grep rbac
# Should show:
# rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
Why it matters: RBAC is the foundation of Kubernetes security. Without it, you have no access control anyone who can authenticate can do anything. This is the most critical security control.
Compliance: Required by CIS 3.1.1, SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI-DSS
Practice 2: Disable Anonymous Authentication
Implementation: Set --anonymous-auth=false on API server
Why it matters: Anonymous auth allows unauthenticated requests to API server with default permissions. This creates unnecessary attack surface. All requests should require authentication.
Verification:
# Try anonymous request (should fail)
curl -k https://CLUSTER_IP:6443/api/v1/namespaces
# Should return 401 Unauthorized if anonymous auth disabled
Compliance: CIS 1.2.1, NSA/CISA Hardening Guide
Practice 3: Implement Strong Authentication (OIDC/LDAP)
Implementation: Configure OIDC or LDAP instead of static client certificates
# API server OIDC flags
--oidc-issuer-url=https://accounts.google.com
--oidc-client-id=kubernetes
--oidc-username-claim=email
--oidc-groups-claim=groups
Why it matters: Client certificates don't expire, can't be revoked easily, and lack MFA support. OIDC enables SSO, MFA, automatic expiration, centralized revocation, and group-based RBAC.
Compliance: SOC 2 (CC6.1), HIPAA (164.312)
Practice 4: Never Grant cluster-admin to Regular Users
Implementation: Audit and remove unnecessary cluster-admin bindings
# List all cluster-admin bindings
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | \\
jq '.items[] | select(.roleRef.name=="cluster-admin") |
{name: .metadata.name, subjects: .subjects}'
# Remove binding for regular user
kubectl delete clusterrolebinding alice-admin
Why it matters: cluster-admin grants unlimited cluster access can read all secrets, delete all resources, modify RBAC, access nodes. Principle of least privilege: grant specific permissions needed, not god-mode access.
Compliance: CIS 5.1.1, SOC 2, all frameworks
Practice 5: Enable Comprehensive Audit Logging
Implementation: Configure API server audit policy
--audit-log-path=/var/log/kubernetes/audit.log
--audit-log-maxage=30
--audit-log-maxbackup=10
--audit-log-maxsize=100
--audit-policy-file=/etc/kubernetes/audit-policy.yaml
Audit policy example:
apiVersion: audit.k8s.io/v1
kind: Policy
rules:
# Log secret access at Metadata level (who accessed, not content)
- level: Metadata
resources:
- group: ""
resources: ["secrets"]
# Log RBAC changes at Request level (full details)
- level: RequestResponse
resources:
- group: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
resources: ["roles", "rolebindings", "clusterroles", "clusterrolebindings"]
# Log pod exec/attach at Metadata level
- level: Metadata
resources:
- group: ""
resources: ["pods/exec", "pods/attach"]
Why it matters: Audit logs provide forensics for security incidents, compliance evidence for auditors, debugging trail for "who changed what when," and detect unauthorized access attempts. Without auditing, you're blind to security events.
Compliance: SOC 2 (CC7.2), HIPAA (164.312(b)), PCI-DSS (10.2)
Practice 6: Disable ServiceAccount Token Auto-Mount
Implementation: Set automountServiceAccountToken: false by default
# Namespace-wide default
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: default
namespace: production
automountServiceAccountToken: false
# Or per-pod
spec:
automountServiceAccountToken: false
Why it matters: By default, every pod gets ServiceAccount token mounted at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. If pod compromised, attacker gets token for Kubernetes API access. Only mount when actually needed.
Compliance: CIS 5.1.5
Practice 7: Create Dedicated ServiceAccounts per Application
Implementation: Never use default ServiceAccount
# Create app-specific ServiceAccount
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: payment-service-sa
namespace: production
---
# Use in deployment
spec:
serviceAccountName: payment-service-sa
Why it matters: Default ServiceAccount is shared by all pods in namespace. Compromising one pod compromises all if they share ServiceAccount. Separate ServiceAccounts enable least-privilege RBAC per application.
Compliance: CIS 5.1.5, SOC 2
Practice 8: Implement Multi-Factor Authentication for Admin Access
Implementation: Require MFA for kubectl access via OIDC provider
Why it matters: Passwords alone are weak (phishing, credential stuffing, password reuse). MFA (something you know + something you have) dramatically reduces account takeover risk. Critical for privileged access.
Compliance: SOC 2 (CC6.1), PCI-DSS (8.3)
Practice 9: Rotate Credentials Regularly
Implementation: Automate credential rotation
- ServiceAccount tokens: Every 90 days
- TLS certificates: Before expiration (typically 1 year)
- Database passwords in Secrets: Every 90 days
- API keys: Every 180 days
Why it matters: Credential rotation limits exposure window if credentials compromised. Stolen credentials become useless after rotation.
Compliance: SOC 2, PCI-DSS (8.2.4)
Practice 10: Implement Session Timeout and Token Expiration
Implementation: Configure short-lived tokens via OIDC
--oidc-username-claim=email
--oidc-groups-claim=groups
# Tokens expire based on OIDC provider config (15-60 minutes typical)
Why it matters: Long-lived tokens remain valid even after user leaves company or role changes. Short expiration forces re-authentication, ensuring access reflects current authorization.
Category 2: Pod Security Standards (Practices 11-20)
Practice 11: Enforce Pod Security Standards at Namespace Level
Implementation: Label namespaces with Pod Security Standard level
# Production: Restricted (most secure)
kubectl label namespace production \\
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \\
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \\
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted
# Staging: Baseline
kubectl label namespace staging \\
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline
# Dev: Privileged (unrestricted)
kubectl label namespace dev \\
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=privileged
Why it matters: Pod Security Standards replaced deprecated PodSecurityPolicies in Kubernetes 1.25+. They enforce security baselines preventing privileged containers, host namespace sharing, and other dangerous configurations.
Compliance: CIS 5.2.x, NSA/CISA Hardening
Practice 12: Never Run Containers as Root
Implementation: Set runAsNonRoot: true and runAsUser: 1000
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true # Enforces non-root
runAsUser: 1000 # Specific UID
runAsGroup: 3000
fsGroup: 2000 # For volume permissions
Why it matters: Running as root (UID 0) inside containers increases risk of container escape attacks. If attacker escapes container, they have root on host. Non-root limits damage.
Compliance: CIS 5.2.6, Required by PSS "restricted" level
Practice 13: Drop All Linux Capabilities
Implementation: Drop ALL capabilities, add only specific ones needed
securityContext:
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL # Drop everything
add:
- NET_BIND_SERVICE # Only if need to bind to port < 1024
Why it matters: Linux capabilities grant partial root privileges (CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, etc.). Dropping ALL removes dangerous capabilities attackers could exploit for privilege escalation.
Compliance: CIS 5.2.9, PSS "restricted"
Practice 14: Use Read-Only Root Filesystem
Implementation:
securityContext:
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
# Use emptyDir for writable paths
volumes:
- name: tmp
emptyDir: {}
- name: cache
emptyDir: {}
volumeMounts:
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
- name: cache
mountPath: /var/cache
Why it matters: Read-only filesystem prevents attackers from writing malware, modifying binaries, or persisting backdoors. Forces immutable infrastructure pattern.
Compliance: PSS "restricted" recommended
Practice 15: Disable Privilege Escalation
Implementation:
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
Why it matters: Prevents setuid/setgid binaries from gaining elevated privileges. Blocks common container escape techniques relying on privilege escalation.
Compliance: CIS 5.2.5, PSS "restricted" required
Practice 16: Set Resource Limits on All Containers
Implementation:
resources:
limits:
cpu: 500m
memory: 512Mi
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 128Mi
Why it matters: Prevents resource exhaustion attacks (cryptominers consuming all CPU, memory bombs crashing nodes). Limits blast radius of compromised containers. Also prevents noisy neighbor problems.
Compliance: CIS 5.2.1, CIS 5.2.2
Practice 17: Implement Liveness and Readiness Probes
Implementation:
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /healthz
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ready
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 5
Why it matters: Detects and automatically restarts compromised or malfunctioning containers. Prevents zombie processes from serving traffic.
Compliance: High availability best practice
Practice 18: Scan Container Images for Vulnerabilities
Implementation: Integrate Trivy, Snyk, or Aqua in CI/CD
# Trivy image scan in pipeline
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL my-app:v1.2.3
# Fail build if HIGH or CRITICAL vulnerabilities found
Why it matters: Container images often contain known vulnerabilities (CVEs). Scanning prevents deploying vulnerable software. 80% of breaches exploit known vulnerabilities with available patches.
Compliance: CIS 5.4.1, SOC 2
Practice 19: Use Minimal Base Images (Distroless or Alpine)
Implementation: Use Google Distroless or Alpine Linux base images
# Instead of:
FROM ubuntu:22.04 # 77MB, many packages, large attack surface
# Use:
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian11 # 2MB, no shell, minimal attack surface
# Or
FROM alpine:3.19 # 7MB, minimal packages
Why it matters: Fewer packages = fewer vulnerabilities = smaller attack surface. Distroless images have no shell, package managers, or unnecessary binaries attackers could use.
Compliance: CIS 5.4.3
Practice 20: Implement Image Signing and Verification
Implementation: Use Sigstore/Cosign or Docker Content Trust
# Sign image with Cosign
cosign sign --key cosign.key my-registry.com/my-app:v1.2.3
# Verify signature in admission controller
# (prevents running unsigned or tampered images)
Why it matters: Prevents supply chain attacks where attackers replace legitimate images with malicious versions. Signing ensures image integrity and authenticity.
Compliance: SLSA Level 3, Supply Chain Security
Category 3: Network Security (Practices 21-30)
Practice 21: Implement Default Deny Network Policies
Implementation: Create deny-all as baseline
# Deny all ingress traffic by default
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-all-ingress
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {} # Applies to ALL pods in namespace
policyTypes:
- Ingress
---
# Deny all egress traffic by default
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-all-egress
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Egress
Why it matters: Default deny = zero-trust networking. Nothing can communicate unless explicitly allowed. Limits lateral movement if container compromised.
Compliance: CIS 5.3.2, Zero Trust Architecture
Practice 22: Explicitly Allow Only Required Traffic
Implementation: Create allow policies for legitimate communication
# Allow frontend -> backend on port 8080 only
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-frontend-to-backend
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: backend
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: frontend
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080 # Only this port
Why it matters: Whitelist-only approach prevents unexpected connections. If backend database compromised, it can't initiate outbound connections to exfiltrate data (egress blocked).
Practice 23: Always Allow DNS (Critical)
Implementation: Allow egress to kube-dns/CoreDNS
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: kube-system # DNS pods in kube-system
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53 # DNS
Why it matters: Everything breaks without DNS. This is the #1 Network Policy mistake—blocking DNS and wondering why nothing works.
Practice 24: Enforce mTLS Between Services with a Service Mesh
Implementation: Enable strict mTLS in your service mesh (e.g., Istio, Linkerd) so all pod-to-pod traffic is encrypted and authenticated.
Example (Istio):
Why it matters: mTLS encrypts traffic in transit and verifies the identity of both client and server using certificates. This prevents eavesdropping, spoofing, and man-in-the-middle attacks between microservices and enforces strong, workload-level identity.
Compliance: Zero Trust Architecture, SOC 2 (CC6.x), HIPAA (164.312(e)), PCI-DSS 4.0 (Data in Transit Encryption)
Practice 25: Enforce TLS for Ingress – HTTPS Everywhere
Implementation: Terminate HTTPS at the Ingress (or API gateway) using valid certificates (Let’s Encrypt via cert-manager, or enterprise PKI). Redirect all HTTP to HTTPS.
Example (Nginx Ingress + cert-manager):
Why it matters: Without TLS, credentials, tokens, and data travel in plaintext and can be intercepted or modified. Enforcing HTTPS for all external traffic is a fundamental security control and often a regulatory requirement.
Compliance: PCI-DSS (4.x – Strong Cryptography), HIPAA (164.312(e)), SOC 2 (CC6.1)
Practice 26: Isolate and Protect the Kubernetes Control Plane
Implementation: Restrict access to the Kubernetes API server to trusted networks only (VPN, bastion hosts, office IPs). Avoid exposing the API directly to the public internet.
Examples:
Use private API endpoints for managed clusters (EKS/GKE/AKS) where possible.
Restrict public access with firewall rules / security groups / master authorized networks.
Force admins to access the API via VPN or bastion.
Example: allow API access only from VPN CIDR (conceptual)
security group / firewall rule:
ALLOW tcp 443 FROM 10.0.0.0/16 (VPN)
DENY tcp 443 FROM 0.0.0.0/0 (Internet)Why it matters: The Kubernetes API is the brain of the cluster. If an attacker reaches it and finds misconfigurations or weak credentials, they can compromise everything. Network isolation dramatically reduces the attack surface and brute-force attempts.
Compliance: CIS Kubernetes Benchmark (API server controls), SOC 2 (CC6.x), Zero Trust Network principles
Practice 27: Enable CNI Network Flow Logging for Forensics
Implementation: Turn on network flow logging in your CNI plugin (e.g., Calico Flow Logs, Cilium Hubble) and send logs to your central logging/SIEM system.
Example (Calico – FelixConfiguration):
Ship /var/log/calico/flows to Loki/ELK/SIEM with an agent (Fluent Bit, Vector, etc.).
Why it matters: Flow logs show who talked to whom, when, and on which ports. They are invaluable for incident investigations, detecting suspicious lateral movement, and validating that NetworkPolicies work as intended.
Compliance: SOC 2 (CC7.x – logging & monitoring), PCI-DSS (10.x – log all network access to cardholder data)
Practice 28: Use Private Container Registries and Restrict Image Sources
Implementation: Store images in private registries (ECR, GCR, ACR, Harbor) and restrict nodes to pull only from approved registries.
Create an imagePullSecret:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: regcred
namespace: production
type: kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson
data:
.dockerconfigjson: <base64-encoded-dockerconfigjson>Attach it to your ServiceAccount:
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: app-sa
namespace: production
imagePullSecrets:
name: regcredAt the network layer, allow egress from nodes only to your approved registries (via firewall rules, VPC endpoints, or NetworkPolicies).
Why it matters: Pulling images from random public registries is a major supply chain risk. Private, controlled registries plus restricted egress prevent untrusted or malicious images from entering your environment.
Compliance: Supply Chain Security (SLSA), SOC 2 (CC6.x), PCI-DSS 4.0 (Software Integrity)
Practice 29: Implement Egress Filtering and Outbound Firewalls
Implementation: Use NetworkPolicies, egress gateways, and/or cloud firewalls to explicitly control outbound traffic from pods and nodes.
Example (restrict egress to a specific external service):
Combine with cloud firewall rules (NACLs / Security Groups) so that default is deny and only specific destinations (databases, payment gateways, APIs, logging endpoints) are allowed.
Why it matters: Without egress controls, a compromised pod can exfiltrate data to any IP on the internet or connect to attacker C2 servers. Egress filtering limits damage and is essential for Zero Trust.
Compliance: Zero Trust Architecture, PCI-DSS (restrict outbound connections), SOC 2 (CC6.x)
Practice 30: Monitor Network Traffic with IDS/NDR
Implementation: Deploy network detection and response (NDR) or IDS tooling that monitors Kubernetes traffic patterns for anomalies:
Use eBPF-based tools (e.g., Cilium Hubble, Tetragon) to observe connections.
Mirror traffic to IDS (Zeek/Suricata) using cloud traffic mirroring / SPAN.
Send alerts to your SIEM when suspicious patterns appear (port scans, unusual outbound connections, spikes in failed connections).
Conceptual example (Hubble UI deployment):
Why it matters: Even with strong NetworkPolicies, you need visibility into what is actually happening on the wire. Network monitoring detects stealthy attacks, lateral movement attempts, and policy misconfigurations that logs alone might miss.
Compliance: SOC 2 (CC7.2 – detect and respond to security events), PCI-DSS (10.x & 11.x – monitoring and intrusion detection)
How Atmosly Automates Kubernetes Security
Pre-Configured Security Controls
Atmosly implements many of these 50 practices automatically:
- RBAC Automation: Pre-configured roles (super_admin, read_only, devops) following least privilege, automatic ServiceAccount creation, proper subject binding
- Pod Security Enforcement: Auto-applies Pod Security Standard labels (restricted for prod, baseline for staging)
- Vulnerability Scanning: Scans deployed workloads, reports CVEs by severity
- Network Policy Recommendations: Analyzes traffic patterns, suggests policies
- Secrets Management: Integrates with Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, tracks rotation
- Compliance Reporting: CIS Kubernetes Benchmark compliance dashboard
- Runtime Threat Detection: AI-powered anomaly detection for suspicious pod behavior
- Audit Logging: Centralized audit trail of all Atmosly-initiated actions
Continuous Security Monitoring
Atmosly continuously monitors for security violations:
- Privileged containers running in production (Policy violation)
- Pods without resource limits (DoS risk)
- ServiceAccounts with cluster-admin (Over-privilege)
- Secrets without encryption at rest
- Images with HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs in production
- Network policies missing from critical namespaces
Alerts with specific remediation guidance and kubectl commands to fix.
Implementing the Checklist: Prioritized Roadmap
Phase 1: Critical (Week 1) - Practices that prevent immediate breaches
- Practice 1: Enable RBAC ✅
- Practice 4: Remove cluster-admin from regular users ✅
- Practice 11: Enforce Pod Security Standards ✅
- Practice 12: Never run as root ✅
- Practice 21: Default deny Network Policies ✅
- Practice 31: Encrypt secrets at rest ✅
- Practice 41: Update Kubernetes (patch CVEs) ✅
Phase 2: High Priority (Week 2-3) - Defense in depth
These practices strengthen cluster defenses beyond the basics and significantly reduce lateral movement, privilege escalation, and secret exposure risks.
Practice 13: Enforce strict container capabilities (drop all, add minimal) ✅
Practice 14: Enforce read-only root filesystem where possible ✅
Practice 15: Enforce seccomp profiles (RuntimeDefault or custom) ✅
Practice 16: Configure AppArmor/SELinux policies for workloads ✅
Practice 17: Use non-root, dedicated service accounts per workload ✅
Practice 22: Implement egress restrictions with Network Policies ✅
Practice 23: Segment namespaces by environment (dev/stage/prod isolation) ✅
Practice 24: Enforce ingress controls & restrict load balancer exposure ✅
Practice 25: Use cluster-wide DNS & identity-based access controls ✅
Practice 32: Adopt an external secrets manager (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.) ✅
Practice 33: Keep all secrets out of Git (Git hygiene + scanners) ✅
Practice 34: Automate secret rotation at defined intervals ✅
Practice 35: Ensure secret versioning and access traceability ✅
Practice 36: Use Sealed Secrets or SOPS for GitOps-safe encryption ✅
Practice 42: Enforce admission controls (OPA Gatekeeper / Kyverno)
Prevent privileged pods, hostPath mounts, unapproved registries. ✅
Practice 43: Disable or secure the Kubernetes Dashboard (SSO-only) ✅
Practice 44: Apply ResourceQuotas + LimitRanges for resource boundaries ✅
Practice 45: Use PodDisruptionBudgets for safe upgrades/rollouts ✅
This phase creates defense-in-depth, ensuring that even if one control fails, multiple layers still protect the cluster.
Phase 3: Medium Priority (Month 1) - Hardening and compliance
These practices finalize your production-grade security posture, ensuring long-term compliance, resilience, and operational integrity.
Practice 18: Configure image pull policies and restrict image tags (no latest) ✅
Practice 19: Enforce immutable images and pinned digests ✅
Practice 20: Scan container images for vulnerabilities (CI/CD + runtime) ✅
Practice 26: Set up multi-layer network segmentation for internal services ✅
Practice 27: Harden cluster ingress (TLS, WAF, mTLS when possible) ✅
Practice 28: Configure node-level firewall rules & metadata protection ✅
Practice 29: Harden API server, kubelet, and control-plane access ✅
Practice 30: Apply least-privilege IAM roles for cloud integrations ✅
Practice 37: Enable audit logging for secret access & API actions ✅
Practice 38: Separate secrets by environment and namespace ✅
Practice 39: Track secret versions and changes for compliance ✅
Practice 40: Monitor secret expiration (TLS certs, API tokens, DB credentials) ✅
Practice 46: Monitor runtime threats using Falco or eBPF sensors ✅
Practice 47: Implement backup & disaster recovery (Velero, snapshots) ✅
Practice 48: Harden worker nodes and underlying OS image ✅
Practice 49: Run regular CIS + vulnerability audits (kube-bench, Trivy, Kubescape) ✅
Practice 50: Establish continuous security & compliance monitoring ✅
By the end of Phase 3, your clusters reach a fully hardened, audit-ready, compliance-aligned state that meets SOC 2, PCI-DSS, ISO 27001, and CIS Kubernetes Benchmark requirements.
Conclusion: Building Defense-in-Depth Security
Kubernetes security requires implementing controls across multiple layers—no single practice protects completely. These 50 best practices provide comprehensive defense-in-depth security posture.
Critical Priorities:
- Enable RBAC with least privilege
- Enforce Pod Security Standards (restricted for production)
- Never run containers as root
- Implement Network Policies (default deny)
- Encrypt secrets, use external secrets manager
- Scan images for vulnerabilities
- Keep Kubernetes patched and updated
- Enable comprehensive audit logging
Implementing all 50 practices manually is time-consuming. Atmosly automates enforcement of these practices, continuously monitors for violations, and provides compliance dashboards showing your security posture against CIS benchmarks.
Ready to implement production-grade Kubernetes security without manual overhead? Start your free Atmosly trial for automated security with built-in best practices and continuous compliance monitoring.
